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Abstract
Blackwell approachability is a framework for reasoning about repeated games
with vector-valued payoffs. We introduce predictive Blackwell approachability,
where an estimate of the next payoff vector is given, and the decision maker tries
to achieve better performance based on the accuracy of that estimator. In order to
derive algorithms that achieve predictive Blackwell approachability, we start by
showing a powerful connection between four well-known algorithms. Follow-the-
regularized-leader (FTRL) and online mirror descent (OMD) are the most preva-
lent regret minimizers in online convex optimization. In spite of this prevalence,
the regret matching (RM) and regret matching+ (RM+) algorithms have been pre-
ferred in the practice of solving large-scale games (as the local regret minimizers
within the counterfactual regret minimization framework). We show that RM and
RM+ are the algorithms that result from running FTRL and OMD, respectively, to
select the halfspace to force at all times in the underlying Blackwell approachabil-
ity game. By applying the predictive variants of FTRL or OMD to this connection,
we obtain predictive Blackwell approachability algorithms, as well as predictive
variants of RM and RM+. In experiments across 18 common zero-sum extensive-
form benchmark games, we show that predictive RM+ coupled with counterfac-
tual regret minimization converges vastly faster than the fastest prior algorithms
(CFR+, DCFR, LCFR) across all games but two of the poker games and Liar’s
Dice, sometimes by two or more orders of magnitude.
1 Introduction
Extensive-form games (EFGs) are the standard class of games that can be used to model sequential
interaction, outcome uncertainty, and imperfect information. Operationalizing these models requires
algorithms for computing game-theoretic equilibria. A recent success of EFGs is the use of Nash
equilibrium for several recent poker AI milestones, such as essentially solving the game of limit
Texas hold’em [6], and beating top human poker pros in no-limit Texas hold’em with the Libratus
AI [7]. A central component of all recent poker AIs has been a fast iterative method for computing
approximate Nash equilibrium at scale. The leading approach is the counterfactual regret minimiza-
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tion (CFR) framework, where the problem of minimizing regret over a player’s strategy space of an
EFG is decomposed into a set of regret-minimization problems over probability simplexes [42, 18].
Each simplex represents the probability over actions at a given decision point. The CFR setup can be
combined with any regret minimizer for the simplexes. If both players in a zero-sum EFG repeatedly
play each other using a CFR algorithm, the average strategies converge to a Nash equilibrium. Ini-
tially regret matching (RM) was the prevalent simplex regret minimizer used in CFR. Later, it was
found that by alternating strategy updates between the players, taking linear averages of strategy
iterates over time, and using a variation of RM called regret-matching+ (RM+) [39] leads to signifi-
cantly faster convergence in practice. This variation is called CFR+. Both CFR and CFR+ guarantee
convergence to Nash equilibrium at a rate of T−1/2. CFR+ has been used in every milestone in de-
veloping poker AIs in the last decade [6, 31, 7, 9]. This is in spite of the fact that its theoretical rate
of convergence is the same as that of CFR with RM [39, 16, 12], and there exist algorithms which
converge at a faster rate of T−1 [24, 27, 17]. In spite of this theoretically-inferior convergence rate,
CFR+ has repeatedly performed favorably against T−1 methods for EFGs [26, 27, 17, 22]. Simi-
larly, the follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) and online mirror descent (OMD) regret minimizers,
the two most prominent algorithms in online convex optimization, can be instantiated to have a better
dependence on dimensionality than RM+ and RM, yet RM+ has been found to be superior [10].
There has been some interest in connecting RM to the more prevalent (and more general) online
convex optimization algorithms such as OMD and FTRL, as well as classical first-order meth-
ods. Waugh and Bagnell [41] showed that RM is equivalent to Nesterov’s dual averaging algorithm
(which is an offline version of FTRL), though this equivalence requires specialized step sizes that
are proven correct by invoking the correctness of RM itself. Burch [11] studies RM and RM+, and
contrasts them with mirror descent and other prox-based methods.
We show a strong connection between RM, RM+, and FTRL, OMD. This connection arises via
Blackwell approachability, a framework for playing games with vector-valued payoffs, where the
goal is to get the average payoff to approach some convex target set. Blackwell originally showed
that this can be achieved by repeatedly forcing the payoffs to lie in a sequence of halfspaces contain-
ing the target set [3]. Our results are based on extending an equivalence between approachability
and regret minimization [1]. We show that RM and RM+ are the algorithms that result from running
FTRL and OMD, respectively, to select the halfspace to force at all times in the underlying Black-
well approachability game. The equivalence holds for any constant step size. Thus, RM and RM+,
the two premier regret minimizers in EFG solving, turn out to follow exactly from the two most
prevalent regret minimizers from online optimization theory. This is surprising for several reasons:
• RM+ was originally discovered as a heuristic modification of RM in order to avoid accumulating
large negative regrets. In contrast, OMD and FTRL were developed separately from each other.
• When applying FTRL and OMD directly to the strategy space of each player, Farina et al. [17, 20]
found that FTRL seems to perform better than OMD, even when using stochastic gradients. This
relationship is reversed here, as RM+ is vastly faster numerically than RM.
• The dual averaging algorithm (whose simplest variant is an offline version of FTRL), was orig-
inally developed in order to have increasing weight put on more recent gradients, as opposed to
OMD which has constant or decreasing weight [32]. Here this relationship is reversed: OMD
(which we show has a close link to RM+) thresholds away old negative regrets, whereas FTRL
keeps them around. Thus OMD ends up being more reactive to recent gradients in our setting.
• FTRL and OMD both have a step-size parameter that needs to be set according to the magnitude
of gradients, while RM and RM+ are parameter free (which is a desirable feature from a practical
perspective). To reconcile this seeming contradiction, we show that the step-size parameter does
not affect which halfspaces are forced, so any choice of step size leads to RM and RM+.
Leveraging our connection, we study the algorithms that result from applying predictive variants of
FTRL and OMD to choosing which halfspace to force. By applying predictive OMD we get the first
predictive variant of RM+, that is, one that has regret that depends on how good the sequence of
predicted regret vectors is (as a side note of their paper, Brown and Sandholm [8] also tried a heuristic
for optimism/predictiveness by counting the last regret vector twice in RM+, but this does not yield a
predictive algorithm). We call our regret minimizer predictive regret matching+ (PRM+). We go on
to instantiate CFR with PRM+ using alternation and quadratic averaging (we call this PCFR+) and
find that it often converges much faster than CFR+ and every other prior CFR variant, sometimes by
several orders of magnitude. We show this on a large suite of common benchmark EFGs. However,
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we find that on poker games (except shallow ones) and Liar’s Dice, discounted CFR (DCFR) [8] is
the fastest. We conclude that PCFR+ is the new state-of-the-art algorithm for the remaining games.
Our results also highlight the need to test on EFGs other than poker, as our non-poker results invert
the superiority of prior algorithms as compared to recent results on poker.
2 Online Linear Optimization, Regret Minimizers, and Predictions
At each time t, an oracle for the online linear optimization (OLO) problem supports the following
two operations, in order: NEXTSTRATEGY returns a point xt ∈ D ⊆ Rn, and OBSERVELOSS
receives a loss vector `t that is meant to evaluate the strategy xt that was last output. Specifically,
the oracle incurs a loss equal to 〈`t,xt〉. The loss vector `t can depend on all past strategies that
were output by the oracle. The oracle operates online in the sense that each strategy xt can depend
only on the decision x1, . . . ,xt−1 output in the past, as well as the loss vectors `1, . . . , `t−1 that
were observed in the past. No information about the future losses `t, `t+1, . . . is available to the
oracle at time t. The objective of the oracle is to make sure the regret
RT (xˆ) :=
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xt〉 −
T∑
t=1
〈`t, xˆ〉 =
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xt − xˆ〉,
which measures the difference between the total loss incurred up to time T compared to always
using the fixed strategy xˆ, does not grow too fast as a function of time T . Oracles that guarantee
that RT (xˆ) grow sublinearly in T in the worst case for all xˆ ∈ D (no matter the sequence of losses
`1, . . . , `T observed) are called regret minimizers. While most theory about regret minimizers is
developed under the assumption that the domain D is convex and compact, in this paper we will
need to consider sets D that are convex and closed, but unbounded (hence, not compact).
Incorporating Predictions A recent trend in online learning has been concerned with con-
structing oracles that can incorporate predictions of the next loss vector `t in the decision mak-
ing [13, 33, 34]. Specifically, a predictive oracle differs from a regular (that is, non-predictive)
oracle for OLO in that the NEXTSTRATEGY function receives a prediction mt ∈ Rn of the next
loss `t at all times t. Conceptually, a “good” predictive regret minimizer should guarantee a superior
regret bound than a non-predictive regret minimizer if mt ≈ `t at all times t. Algorithms exist that
can guarantee this. For instance, it is always possible to construct an oracle that guarantees that
RT = O(1 +
∑T
t=1 ‖`t−mt‖2), which implies that the regret stays constant whenmt is clairvoy-
ant. In fact, even stronger regret bounds can be attained: for example, Syrgkanis et al. [38] show that
the sharper Regret bounded by Variation in Utilities (RVU) condition can be attained, while Farina
et al. [15] focus on stable-predictivity.
FTRL, OMD, and their Predictive Variants Follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) [36] and on-
line mirror descent (OMD) are the two best known oracles for the online linear optimization prob-
lem. Their predictive variants are relatively new and can be traced back to the works by Rakhlin and
Sridharan [33] and Syrgkanis et al. [38]. Since the original FTRL and OMD algorithms correspond
to predictive FTRL and predictive OMD when the prediction mt is set to the 0 vector at all t, the
implementation of FTRL in Algorithm 1 and OMD in Algorithm 2 captures both algorithms. In
both algorithm, η > 0 is an arbitrary stepsize parameter, D ⊆ Rn is a convex and closed set, and
ϕ : D → R≥0 is a 1-strongly convex differentiable regularizer (with respect to some norm ‖ · ‖).
The symbol Dϕ( ‖ ) used in OMD denotes the Bregman divergence associated with ϕ, defined as
Dϕ(x ‖ c) := ϕ(x)− ϕ(c)− 〈∇ϕ(c),x− c〉 for all x, c ∈ D.
We state regret guarantees for (predictive) FTRL and (predictive) OMD in Proposition 1. Our state-
ments are slightly more general than those by Syrgkanis et al. [38], in that we (i) do not assume
that the domain is a simplex, and (ii) do not use quantities that might be unbounded in non-compact
domains D. A proof of the regret bounds is in Appendix A for FTRL and Appendix B for OMD.
Proposition 1. For all xˆ ∈ D, and times T , the regret cumulated by (predictive) FTRL (Algorithm 1)
and (predictive) OMD (Algorithm 2) compared to any fixed strategy xˆ ∈ D is bounded as
RT (xˆ) ≤ ϕ(xˆ)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
cη
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2, (1)
where c = 4 for FTRL and c = 8 for OMD, and where ‖ · ‖∗ denotes the dual of the norm ‖ · ‖ with
respect to which ϕ is 1-strongly convex.
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Algorithm 1: (Predictive) FTRL
1 L0 ← 0 ∈ Rn
2 function NEXTSTRATEGY(mt)
. Setmt = 0 for non-predictive version
3 return arg min
xˆ∈D
{
〈Lt−1 +mt, xˆ〉+ 1
η
ϕ(xˆ)
}
4 function OBSERVELOSS(`t)
5 Lt ← Lt−1 + `t
Algorithm 2: (Predictive) OMD
1 z0 ∈ D such that∇ϕ(z0) = 0
2 function NEXTSTRATEGY(mt)
. Setmt = 0 for non-predictive version
3 return arg min
xˆ∈D
{
〈mt, xˆ〉+ 1
η
Dϕ(xˆ ‖zt−1)
}
4 function OBSERVELOSS(`t)
5 zt ← arg min
zˆ∈D
{
〈`t, zˆ〉+ 1
η
Dϕ(zˆ ‖zt−1)
}
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 imply that, by appropriately setting the stepsize parameter (for
example, η = T−1/2), (predictive) FTRL and (predictive) OMD guarantee that RT (xˆ) = O(T 1/2)
for all xˆ. Hence, (predictive) FTRL and (predictive) OMD are regret minimizers.
3 Blackwell Approachability
Blackwell approachability [3] generalizes the problem of playing a repeated two-player game to
games whose utilites are vectors instead of scalars. In a Blackwell approachability game, at all
times t, two players interact in this order: first, Player 1 selects an action xt ∈ X ; then, Player 2
selects an action yt ∈ Y; finally, Player 1 incurs the vector-valued payoff u(xt,yt) ∈ Rd, where u
is a biaffine function. The sets X ,Y of player actions are assumed to be compact convex sets. Player
1’s objective is to guarantee that the average payoff converges to some desired closed convex target
set S ⊆ Rd. Formally, given target set S ⊆ Rd, Player 1’s goal is to pick actions x1,x2, . . . ∈ X
such that no matter the actions y1,y2, . . . ∈ Y played by Player 2,
min
sˆ∈S
∥∥∥∥∥sˆ− 1T
T∑
t=1
u(xt,yt)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
→ 0 as T →∞. (2)
A central concept in the theory of Blackwell approachability is the following.
Definition 1 (Approachable halfspace, forcing function). Let (X ,Y,u(·, ·), S) be a Blackwell ap-
proachability game as described above and let H ⊆ Rd be a halfspace, that is, a set of the form
H = {x ∈ Rd : a>x ≤ b} for some a ∈ Rd, b ∈ R. The halfspace H is said to be forceable if there
exists a strategy of Player 1 that guarantees that the payoff is in H no matter the actions played by
Player 2. In symbols, H is forceable if there exists x∗ ∈ X such that for all y ∈ Y , u(x∗,y) ∈ H .
When this is the case, we call action x∗ a forcing action for H .
Blackwell’s approachability theorem [3] states that goal (2) can be attained if and only if all halfs-
pacesH ⊇ S are forceable. Blackwell approachability has a number of applications and connections
to other problems in the online learning and game theory literature (e.g., [2, 21, 23]).
In this paper we leverage the Blackwell approachability formalism to draw new connections be-
tween FTRL and OMD with RM and RM+, respectively. We also introduce predictive Blackwell
approachability, and show that it can be used to develop new state-of-the-art algorithms for simplex
domains and imperfect-information extensive-form zero-sum games.
4 From Online Linear Optimization to Blackwell Approachability
Abernethy et al. [1] showed that it is always possible to convert a regret minimizer into an algorithm
for a Blackwell approachability game (that is, an algorithm that chooses actions xt at all times t in
such a way that goal (2) holds no matter the actions y1,y2, . . . played by the opponent). In this
section, we slightly extend their constructive proof by allowing more flexibility in the choice of the
domain of the regret minimizer. This extra flexibility will be needed to show that RM and RM+ can
be obtained directly from FTRL and OMD, respectively.
We start from the case where the target set in the Blackwell approachability game is a closed convex
cone C ⊆ Rn. As Proposition 2 shows, Algorithm 3 provides a way of playing the Blackwell
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Algorithm 3: From OLO to (predictive) approachability
Data: D ⊆ Rn convex and closed, s.t. K := C◦ ∩ Bn2 ⊆ D ⊆ C◦
L online linear optimization algorithm for domain D
1 function NEXTSTRATEGY(vt)
. Set vt = 0 for non-predictive version
2 θt ← L.NEXTSTRATEGY(−vt)
3 xt ← forcing action for halfspace Ht := {z : 〈θt,z〉 ≤ 0}
4 return xt ∈ X
5 function RECEIVEPAYOFF(u(xt,yt))
6 L.OBSERVELOSS(−u(xt,yt))
C
C◦
Kθt
Ht
Figure 1: (Left) Reduction from an OLO oracle to a strategy for playing a Blackwell approachability
game. (Right) Pictorial depiction of Algorithm 3’s inner working: at all times t, the algorithm plays
a forcing action for the halfspace Ht induced by the last decision output by the OLO oracle L.
approachability game that guarantees that (2) is satisfied (the proof is in Appendix C). In broad
strokes, Algorithm 3 works as follows: the regret minimizer has as its decision space the polar cone
to C (or a subset thereof), and its decision is used as the normal vector in choosing a halfspace to
force. At time t, the algorithm plays a forcing action xt for the halfspace Ht induced by the last
decision θt output by the OLO oracle L. Then, L incurs the loss −u(xt,yt), where u is the payoff
function of the Blackwell approachability game.
Proposition 2. Let (X ,Y,u(·, ·), C) be an approachability game, whereC ⊆ Rn is a closed convex
cone, such that each halfspace H ⊇ C is approachable (Definition 1). Let K := C◦ ∩ Bn2 , where
C◦ = {x ∈ Rn : 〈x,y〉 ≤ 0 ∀y ∈ C} denotes the polar cone to C. Finally, let L be an oracle
for the OLO problem (for example, the FTRL or OMD algorithm) whose domain of decisions is any
closed convex set D, such that K ⊆ D ⊆ C◦. Then, at all times T , the distance between the average
payoff cumulated by Algorithm 3 and the target cone C is upper bounded as
min
sˆ∈C
∥∥∥∥∥sˆ− 1T
T∑
t=1
u(xt,yt)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
T
max
xˆ∈K
RTL(xˆ),
where RTL(xˆ) is the regret cumulated by L up to time T compared to always playing xˆ ∈ K.
As K is compact, by virtue of L being a regret minimizer, 1/T ·maxxˆ∈KRT (xˆ) → 0 as T → ∞,
Algorithm 3 satisfies the Blackwell approachability goal (2). The fact that Proposition 2 applies
only to conic target sets does not limit its applicability. Indeed, Abernethy et al. [1] showed that
any Blackwell approachability game with a non-conic target set can be efficiently transformed to
another one with a conic target set. In this paper, we only need to focus on conic target sets.
The construction by Abernethy et al. [1] coincides with Proposition 2 in the special case where the
domainD is set toD = K. In the next section, we will need our added flexibility in the choice ofD:
in order to establish the connection between RM+ and OMD, it is necessary to set D = C◦ 6= K.
5 Connections between FTRL, OMD, RM, and RM+
Constructing a regret minimizer for a simplex domain ∆n := {x ∈ R≥0 : ‖x‖1 = 1} can
be reduced to constructing an algorithm for a particular Blackwell approachability game Γ :=
(∆n,Rn,u(·, ·),Rn≤0) that we now describe [23]. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the i-th component of
the vector-valued payoff function u measures the change in regret incurred at time t, compared to
always playing the i-th vertex ei of the simplex. Formally,
u : ∆n × Rn → Rn, (xt, `t) 7→ 〈`t,xt〉1− `t =
(
〈xt, `t〉 − `t1, . . . , 〈xt, `t〉 − `tn
)
. (3)
It is known that Γ is such that the halfspace Ha := {x ∈ Rn : 〈x,a〉 ≤ 0} ⊇ Rn≤0 is forceable
(Definition 1) for all a ∈ Rn≥0. A forcing action for Ha is given by g(a) := a/‖a‖1 ∈ ∆n
when a 6= 0; when a = 0, any x ∈ ∆n is a forcing action. When the approachability game Γ is
solved by means of the constructive proof of Blackwell’s approachability theorem [3], one recovers
5
a particular regret minimizer for the domain ∆n known as the regret matching (RM) algorithm [23].
The same cannot be said for the closely related RM+ algorithm [39], which converges significantly
faster in practice than RM, as has been reported many times.
We now uncover deep and surprising connections between RM, RM+ and the OLO algorithms
FTRL, OMD by solving Γ using Algorithm 3. Let Lftrlη be the FTRL algorithm instantiated over the
conic domain D = Rn≥0 with the 1-strongly convex regularizer ϕ(x) = 1/2 ‖x‖22 and an arbitrary
stepsize parameter η. Similarly, let Lomdη be the OMD algorithm instantiated over the same domain
D = Rn≥0 with the same convex regularizer ϕ(x) = 1/2 ‖x‖22. Since Rn≥0 = (Rn≤0)◦, D satisfies
the requirements of Proposition 2. So, Lftrlη and Lomdη can be plugged into Algorithm 3 to compute a
strategy for the Blackwell approachability game Γ. When that is done, the following can be shown
(all proofs for this section are in Appendix D).
Theorem 1 (FTRL reduces to RM). For all η > 0, when Algorithm 3 is set up with D = Rn≥0 and
the regret minimizer Lftrlη to play Γ, it produces the same iterates as the RM algorithm.
Theorem 2 (OMD reduces to RM+). For all η > 0, when Algorithm 3 is set up with D = Rn≥0 and
the regret minimizer Lomdη to play Γ, it produces the same iterates as the RM+ algorithm.
Pseudocode for RM and RM+ is given in Algorithms 4 and 5 (when mt = 0). In hindsight, the
equivalence between RM and RM+ with FTRL and OMD is clear. The computation of θt on Line 3
in both PRM and PRM+ corresponds to the closed-form solution for the minimization problems of
Line 4 in FTRL and Line 3 in OMD, respectively, in accordance with Line 2 of Algorithm 3. Next,
Lines 4 and 5 in both PRM and PRM+ compute the forcing action required in Line 3 of Algorithm 3
using the function g defined above. Finally, in accordance with Line 6 of Algorithm 3, Line 7 of
PRM corresponds to Line 6 of FTRL, and Line 7 of PRM+ to Line 5 of OMD.
6 Predictive Blackwell Approachability, and Predictive RM and RM+
It is natural to wonder whether it is possible to devise an algorithm for Blackwell approachability
games that is able to guarantee faster convergence to the target set when good predictions of the next
vector payoff are available. We call this setup predictive Blackwell approachability. We answer the
question in the positive by leveraging Proposition 2. Since the loss incurred by the regret minimizer
is `t := −u(xt,yt) (Line 6 in Algorithm 3), any prediction vt of the payoff u(xt,yt) is naturally
a prediction about the next loss incurred by the underlying regret minimizer L used in Algorithm 3.
Hence, as long as the prediction is propagated as in Line 2 in Algorithm 3, Proposition 2 holds
verbatim. In particular, we prove the following. All proofs for this section are in Appendix E.
Proposition 3. Let (X ,Y,u(·, ·), S) be a Blackwell approachability game, where every halfspace
H ⊇ S is approachable (Definition 1). For all T , given predictions vt of the payoff vectors, there
exist algorithms for playing the game (that is, pick xt ∈ X at all t) that guarantee
min
sˆ∈S
∥∥∥∥∥sˆ− 1T
T∑
t=1
u(xt,yt)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1√
T
(
1 +
2
T
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt,yt)− vt‖22
)
.
In Section 5 we showed that when Algorithm 3 is used in conjunction with FTRL and OMD on the
Blackwell approachability game Γ of Section 5, the iterates coincide with those of RM and RM+,
respectively. In the rest of this section we investigate the use of predictive FTRL and predictive
OMD in that framework. We coin the resulting predictive regret minimization algorithms predictive
regret matching (PRM) and predictive regret matching+ (PRM+), respectively.
Ideally, starting from the prediction mt of the next loss, we would want the prediction vt of the
next utility in the equivalent Blackwell game Γ (Section 5) to be vt = 〈mt,xt〉1−mt to maintain
symmetry with (3). However, vt is computed before xt is computed, and xt depends on vt, so
the previous expression requires the computation of a fixed point. To sidestep this issue, we let
vt := 〈mt,xt−1〉1−mt instead. We give pseudocode for PRM and PRM+ as Algorithms 4 and 5.
Theorem 3 (Correctness of PRM, PRM+). Let Lftrl*η and Lomd*η denote the predictive FTRL and
predictive OMD algorithms instantiated with the same choice of regularizer and domain as in Sec-
tion 5, and predictions vt as defined above for the Blackwell approachability game Γ. For all η > 0,
when Algorithm 3 is set up with D = Rn≥0, the regret minimizer Lftrl*η (resp., Lomd*η ) to play Γ, it
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Algorithm 4: (Predictive) regret matching
1 r0 ← 0 ∈ Rn, x0 ← 1/n ∈ ∆n
2 function NEXTSTRATEGY(mt)
. Setmt = 0 for non-predictive version
3 θt ← [rt−1 + 〈mt,xt−1〉1−mt]+
4 if θt 6= 0 return xt ← θt / ‖θt‖1
5 else return xt ← arbitrary point in ∆n
6 function OBSERVELOSS(`t)
7 rt ← rt + 〈`t,xt〉1− `t
Algorithm 5: (Predictive) regret matching+
1 z0 ← 0 ∈ Rn, x0 ← 1/n ∈ ∆n
2 function NEXTSTRATEGY(mt)
. Setmt = 0 for non-predictive version
3 θt ← [zt−1 + 〈mt,xt−1〉1−mt]+
4 if θt 6= 0 return xt ← θt / ‖θt‖1
5 else return xt ← arbitrary point in ∆n
6 function OBSERVELOSS(`t)
7 zt ← [zt−1 + 〈`t,xt〉1− `t]+
produces the same iterates as the PRM (resp., PRM+) algorithm. Furthermore, PRM and PRM+
are regret minimizer for the domain ∆n, and at all times T satisfy the regret bound
RT (xˆ) ≤
√
2
(
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt, `t)− vt‖22
)1/2
=
√
2
(
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥〈`t,xt〉1− 〈mt,xt−1〉1− (`t −mt)∥∥∥2
2
)1/2
.
In particular, Theorem 3 shows that PRM and PRM+ guarantee O(
√
T ) regret at all times T .
7 Experiments
We conduct experiments on solving two-player zero-sum games. As mentioned previously, for EFGs
the CFR framework is used for decomposing regrets into local regret minimization problems at each
simplex corresponding to a decision point in the game [42, 16], and we do the same. However,
as the regret minimizer for each local decision point, we use PRM+ instead of RM, and we use
quadratic averaging, that is, we average the sequence-form strategies x1, . . . ,xT using the formula
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T (T+1)(2T+1)
∑T
t=1 t
2xt, and we use alternating updates. We call this algorithm PCFR+. We
compare PCFR+ to the prior state-of-the-art CFR variants: CFR+ [39], Discounted CFR (DCFR)
with its recommended parameters [8], and Linear CFR (LCFR) [8].
We conduct the experiments on common benchmark games. We show results on five games in the
main body of the paper. An additional 13 games are shown in the appendix. The experiments shown
in the main body are representative of those in the appendix. A description of all the games is in
Appendix G, and the results are shown in Figure 2. The x-axis shows the number of iterations of each
algorithm. Every algorithm pays almost exactly the same cost per iteration, since the predictions
require only one additional thresholding step in PCFR+. For each game, the top plot shows on
the y-axis the Nash gap, while the bottom plot shows the accuracy in our predictions of the regret
vector, measured as the average `2 norm of the difference between the actual loss `t received and its
prediction mt across all regret minimizers at all decision points in the game. For all non-predictive
algorithms (CFR+, LCFR, and DCFR), we letmt = 0. Both y-axes are in log scale.
On Battleship and Pursuit-evasion, PCFR+ is faster than the other algorithms by 3-6 orders of mag-
nitude already after 500 iterations, and around 10 orders of magnitude after 2000 iterations. On
Goofspiel, PCFR+ is also significantly faster than the other algorithms, by 0.5-1 order of mag-
nitude. Finally, in the River endgame, our only poker experiment here, PCFR+ is slightly faster
than CFR+, but slower than DCFR. Across all non-poker games in the appendix, we also find that
PCFR+ beats the other algorithms, often by several orders of magnitude. We conclude that PCFR+
seems to be the fastest method for solving non-poker EFGs. The only exception to the non-poker-
game empirical rule is Liar’s Dice (game [B]), where our predictive method and LCFR both perform
noticeably worse than CFR+ and DCFR.
We tested on three poker games, the River endgame shown here (which is a real endgame encoun-
tered by the Libratus AI [7] in the man-machine “Brains vs. Artificial Intelligence: Upping the
Ante” competition), as well as Kuhn and Leduc poker in the appendix. On Kuhn poker, PCFR+
is extremely fast and the fastest of the algorithms. That game is known to be significantly easier
than deeper EFGs for predictive algorithms [17]. On Leduc poker as well as the River endgame, the
predictions in PCFR+ do not seem to help as much as in other games. On the River endgame, the
performance is essentially the same as that of CFR+. On Leduc poker, it leads to a small speedup
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[E] Pursuit-evasion Dimension of the games
Decision
points Actions Leaves
[A] 4.4×106 5.3×106 1.7×106
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Figure 2: Performance of PCFR+, CFR+, DCFR, and LCFR on five EFGs. In all plots, the x axis is
the number of iterations of each algorithm. For each game, the top plot shows that the Nash gap on
the y axis (on a log scale), the bottom plot shows and the average prediction error (on a log scale).
over CFR+. On both of those games, DCFR is fastest. In contrast, DCFR actually performs worse
than CFR+ in our non-poker experiments, though it is sometimes on par with CFR+. We conclude
that PCFR+ is much faster than CFR+: it is dramatically faster on non-poker games; it is always at
least as fast as CFR+ on the poker games; it perform worse only in Liar’s Dice.
The convergence rate of PCFR+ is closely related to how good the predictions mt of `t are. On
Battleship and Pursuit-evasion, the predictions become extremely accurate very rapidly, and PCFR+
converges at an extremely fast rate. On Goofspiel, the predictions are fairly accurate (the error
is of the order 10−5) and PCFR+ is still significantly faster than the other algorithms. On the
River endgame, the average prediction error is of the order 10−3, and PCFR+ performs on par with
CFR+, and slower than DCFR. Similar trends prevail in the experiments in the appendix. Additional
experimental insights are described in the appendix. For example, we find that PRM+ converges
very rapidly on the smallmatrix game, a 2-by-2 matrix game where CFR+ and other RM-based
methods converge at a rate slower than T−1 [17].
8 Conclusions and Future Research
We introduced the notion of predictive Blackwell approachability. To develop algorithms for this
setting, we extended Abernethy et al. [1]’s reduction of Blackwell approachability to regret mini-
mization beyond the compact setting. We then showed that predictive (and non-predictive) FTRL
and OMD can be applied to this unbounded setting. This extended reduction allowed us to show that
FTRL applied to the decision of which halfspace to force in Blackwell approachability is equivalent
to the regret matching algorithm. Surprisingly, OMD applied to the same problem turned out to be
equivalent to RM+, which is vastly faster than RM in practice. Then, we showed that the predictive
variants of FTRL and OMD yield predictive algorithms for Blackwell approachability, as well as
predictive variants of RM and RM+. Combining PRM+ with CFR, we introduced the PCFR+ algo-
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rithm for solving EFGs. Experiments across many common benchmark games showed that PCFR+
outperforms the prior state-of-the-art algorithms on non-poker games by orders of magnitude.
This work also opens future directions. Can PRM+ guarantee T−1 convergence on matrix games
like optimistic FTRL and OMD, or do the less stable updates prevent that? Can one develop a
predictive variant of DCFR, which is faster on poker domains? Can one combine DCFR and PCFR+,
so DCFR would be faster initially but PCFR+ would overtake? If the cross-over point could be
approximated, this might yield a best-of-both-worlds algorithm.
9 Broader Impact
In this paper, we contributed several theoretical and algorithmic results. The most direct impact
is practical advancements in equilibrium computation: in most cases, the regret minimizers we
introduce converge to equilibrium in extensive-form imperfect-information games faster than the
prior state of the art.
The downstream applications of our results are hard to predict. For one, our results could be used
to compute strong, game-theoretic strategies in strategic interactions between rational agents. If
all agents in the interaction have comparable access to equilibrium computation technology, this
can result in improved social welfare and economic efficiency. On the other hand, if only a small
subset of agents have access to technology that is able to compute strong strategies, those strategies
could be used to maximally exploit agents that do not have access to such technology. This risk is
especially true in zero-sum interactions, where a gain in value for one agent has to be compensated
by a loss in value from one (or more) of the other agents.
We believed that publishing this paper and disseminating fast algorithms for equilibrium computa-
tion is a first step towards mitigating the risk of unequal access to equilibrium-finding technology.
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A Analysis of (Predictive) FTRL
In the proof of Proposition 5 we will use the following technical lemma (see, e.g, [17]).
Lemma 1. Let ϕ : D → R≥0 be a 1-strongly convex differentiable regularizer with respect to some norm ‖ · ‖,
and let ‖ · ‖∗ be the dual norm to ‖ · ‖. Finally, let ψ : Rn → D be the function
ψ : g 7→ arg min
xˆ∈D
{
〈g, xˆ〉+ 1
η
ϕ(xˆ)
}
.
Then, ψ is η-Lipschitz continuous with respect to the dual norm, in the sense that
‖ψ(g)−ψ(g′)‖ ≤ η ‖g − g′‖∗ ∀g, g′ ∈ Rn.
Proposition 4. Let ϕ : D → R≥0 be a 1-strongly regularizer with respect to some norm ‖ · ‖, and let ‖ · ‖∗ be
the dual norm to ‖ · ‖. For all xˆ ∈ D, all η > 0, and all times T , the regret cumulated by (predictive) FTRL
(Algorithm 1) compared to any fixed strategy xˆ ∈ D is bounded as
RT (xˆ) ≤ ϕ(xˆ)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2. (4)
Proof. We combine several techniques and insights from the original works of Rakhlin and Sridharan [33] and
Syrgkanis et al. [38]. Let ψ : Rn → D be the function that maps
ψ : g 7→ arg min
xˆ∈D
{
〈g, xˆ〉+ 1
η
ϕ(xˆ)
}
.
With that notation, at all times t, predictive FTRL outputs the decision xt = ψ(Lt−1 + mt), where Lt−1 =∑t−1
τ=1 `
τ . For the purpose of this proof, we also introduce the sequence wt := ψ(Lt) for t = 1, 2, . . . . For any
xˆ ∈ D,
RT (xˆ) =
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xt − xˆ〉 =
T∑
t=1
〈mt,xt −wt〉+ 〈`t,wt − xˆ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
T∑
t=1
〈`t −mt,xt −wt〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
We now bound each of the three terms on the right-hand side:
A A critical observation to bound A is the following. Since ψ(g) is a minimizer of 〈g, xˆ〉 + 1ηϕ(xˆ), then by
the fist-order optimality conditions,〈
g +
1
η
∇ϕ(ψ(g)), ξ −ψ(g)
〉
≥ 0 ∀g ∈ Rn, ξ ∈ D. (5)
Using the hypothesis on the 1-strongly convexity of ϕ and applying (5), for all ξ we obtain
1
η
ϕ(ξ) + 〈g, ξ〉 ≥ 1
η
ϕ(ψ(g)) + 〈g,ψ(g)〉+
〈
g +
1
η
∇ϕ(ψ(g)), ξ −ψ(g)
〉
+
1
2η
‖ξ −ψ(g)‖2
≥ 1
η
ϕ(ψ(g)) + 〈g,ψ(g)〉+ 1
2η
‖ξ −ψ(g)‖2. (6)
By applying (6) to the two choices (g, ξ) = (Lt−1,xt), (Lt−1 + mt,wt), respectively, we have the two
inequalities
1
η
ϕ(xt) + 〈Lt−1,xt〉 ≥ 1
η
ϕ(wt−1) + 〈Lt−1,wt−1〉+ 1
2η
‖xt −wt−1‖2
1
η
ϕ(wt) + 〈Lt−1 +mt,wt〉 ≥ 1
η
ϕ(xt) + 〈Lt−1 +mt,xt〉+ 1
2η
‖wt − xt‖2.
Summing the two above inequalities and rearranging terms yields
〈mt,xt −wt〉 ≤ 1
η
(ϕ(wt)− ϕ(wt−1)) + 〈Lt−1,wt −wt−1〉 − 1
2η
(
‖xt −wt−1‖2 + ‖wt − xt‖2
)
.
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Summing over t = 1, . . . , T and simplifying telescopic terms,
T∑
t=1
〈mt,xt −wt〉 ≤ 1
η
(ϕ(wT )− ϕ(w0)) +
T∑
t=1
〈Lt−1,wt −wt−1〉 −
T∑
t=1
1
2η
(
‖xt −wt−1‖2 + ‖wt − xt‖2
)
≤ 1
η
(ϕ(wT )− ϕ(w0)) +
T∑
t=1
〈Lt−1,wt −wt−1〉 −
T−1∑
t=1
1
2η
(
‖xt+1 −wt‖2 + ‖wt − xt‖2
)
≤ 1
η
(ϕ(wT )− ϕ(w0)) +
T∑
t=1
〈Lt−1,wt −wt−1〉 −
T−1∑
t=1
1
4η
‖xt+1 − xt‖2,
where the second inequality follows by removing a term from the last parenthesis and rearranging, and the
third from the parallelogram inequality ‖a‖2 + ‖b‖2 ≥ 12‖a + b‖2 valid for all choices of vectors a, b and
norm ‖ · ‖.
In order to recognize A on the left-hand side, we add the quantity
∑T
t=1〈`t,wt − xˆ〉 on both sides, and
obtain
A ≤ 1
η
(ϕ(wT )− ϕ(w0)) +
T∑
t=1
(
〈`t,wt − xˆ〉+ 〈Lt−1,wt −wt−1〉
)
− 1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2
=
1
η
(ϕ(wT )− ϕ(w0)) +
T∑
t=1
(
〈Lt,wt〉 − 〈Lt−1,wt−1〉 − 〈`t, xˆ〉
)
− 1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2
=
1
η
(ϕ(wT )− ϕ(w0)) + 〈LT ,wT − xˆ〉 − 1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2, (7)
where we simplified the telescopic sum
∑T
t=1〈Lt,wt〉−〈Lt−1,wt−1〉 = 〈LT ,wT 〉 in the last step. Finally,
using Equation (6) with g = LT , ξ = xˆ, we can write
1
η
ϕ(xˆ) + 〈LT , xˆ〉 ≥ 1
η
ϕ(wT ) + 〈LT ,wT 〉 =⇒ 1
η
ϕ(wT ) + 〈LT ,wT − xˆ〉 ≤ 1
η
ϕ(xˆ),
and substituting the last expression into (7), we obtain
A ≤ 1
η
(ϕ(xˆ)− ϕ(w0))−
T−1∑
t=1
1
4η
‖xt+1 − xt‖2 ≤ ϕ(xˆ)
η
− 1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2. (8)
B By applying the generalized Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Lemma 1,
〈`t −mt,xt −wt〉 ≤ ‖`t −mt‖∗ ‖xt −wt‖ ≤ η‖`t −mt‖2∗.
Hence,
B =
T∑
t=1
〈`t −mt,xt −wt〉 ≤ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗. (9)
Finally, summing the bounds for A (8) and for B (9), we obtain the statement.
B Analysis of (Predictive) OMD
In the proof of Proposition 5 we will use the two following technical lemmas.
Lemma 2. For any a, b ∈ Rn and ρ > 0, it holds that 〈a, b〉 ≤ ρ
2
‖a‖2∗ +
1
2ρ
‖b‖2.
Proof. By the arithmetic mean-geometric mean inequality, we have
ρ
2
‖a‖2∗ +
1
2ρ
‖b‖2 = 1
2
(
ρ‖a‖2∗ +
1
ρ
‖b‖2
)
≥
√
‖a‖2∗ · ‖b‖2 = ‖a‖∗ · ‖b‖ ≥ 〈a, b〉,
where we used the generalized Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in the last step.
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Lemma 3. Let D ⊆ Rd be closed and convex, let g ∈ Rn, c ∈ D, and Let ϕ : D → R≥0 be a 1-strongly convex
differentiable regularizer with respect to some norm ‖ · ‖, and let ‖ · ‖∗ be the dual norm to ‖ · ‖. Then,
a∗ := arg min
aˆ∈D
{
〈g, aˆ〉+ 1
η
Dϕ(aˆ ‖ c)
}
is well defined (that is, the minimizer exists and is unique), and for all aˆ ∈ D satisfies the inequality
〈g,a∗ − aˆ〉 ≤ 1
η
(
Dϕ(aˆ ‖ c)−Dϕ(aˆ ‖a∗)−Dϕ(a∗ ‖ c)
)
.
Proof. The necessary first-order optimality conditions for the argmin problem in the statement is〈
∇a
[
〈g,a〉+ 1
η
Dϕ(a ‖ c)
]
(a∗),a∗ − aˆ
〉
≥ 0 ∀ aˆ ∈ D.
Expanding the gradient, we have that for all aˆ ∈ D〈
g − 1
η
(
∇ϕ(a∗)−∇ϕ(c)
)
,a∗ − aˆ
〉
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ 〈g,a∗ − aˆ〉 ≤ 1
η
〈
∇ϕ(a∗)−∇ϕ(c),a∗ − aˆ
〉
.
Finally, noting that〈
∇ϕ(a∗)−∇ϕ(c),a∗ − aˆ
〉
=
(
ϕ(aˆ)− ϕ(c)− 〈∇ϕ(c), aˆ− c〉
)
−
(
ϕ(aˆ)− ϕ(a∗)− 〈∇ϕ(a∗), aˆ− a∗〉
)
−
(
ϕ(a∗)− ϕ(c)− 〈∇ϕ(c),a∗ − c〉
)
= Dϕ(aˆ ‖ c)−Dϕ(aˆ ‖a∗)−Dϕ(a∗ ‖ c)
yields the statement.
Proposition 5. Let ϕ : D → R≥0 be a 1-strongly convex differentiable regularizer with respect to some norm
‖ · ‖, and let ‖ · ‖∗ be the dual norm to ‖ · ‖. For all xˆ ∈ D, all η > 0, and all times T , the regret cumulated by
(predictive) OMD (Algorithm 2) compared to any fixed strategy xˆ ∈ D is bounded as
RT (xˆ) ≤ Dϕ(xˆ ‖ z
0)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
8η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2. (10)
Proof. We combine several techniques and insights from the original works of Rakhlin and Sridharan [33] and
Syrgkanis et al. [38]. For any xˆ ∈ D,
RT (xˆ) =
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xt − xˆ〉 =
T∑
t=1
(
〈`t −mt,xt − zt〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+ 〈mt,xt − zt〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
+ 〈`t, zt − xˆ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
)
We now bound each of the three terms on the right-hand side:
A We use Lemma 2 with ρ = 2η to bound the first term:
〈`t −mt,xt − zt〉 ≤ η‖`t −mt‖2∗ +
1
4η
‖xt − zt‖2.
B C In order to bound these terms, we use Lemma 3:
〈mt,xt − zt〉 ≤ 1
η
(
Dϕ(z
t ‖ zt−1)−Dϕ(zt ‖xt)−Dϕ(xt ‖ zt−1)
)
〈`t, zt − xˆ〉 ≤ 1
η
(
Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt−1)−Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt)−Dϕ(zt ‖ zt−1)
)
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Hence, combining all bounds, we have that for any xˆ ∈ D,
RT (xˆ) ≤
T∑
t=1
(
η‖`t −mt‖2∗ +
1
4η
‖xt − zt‖2
+
1
η
(
Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt−1)−Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt)−Dϕ(zt ‖xt)−Dϕ(xt ‖ zt−1)
))
≤
T∑
t=1
(
η‖`t −mt‖2∗ +
1
4η
‖xt − zt‖2 + 1
η
(
Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt−1)−Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt)
)
− 1
2η
(
‖xt − zt‖2 + ‖xt − zt−1‖2
))
=
T∑
t=1
(
η‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
4η
‖xt − zt‖2 − 1
2η
‖xt − zt−1‖2 + 1
η
(
Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt−1)−Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt)
))
≤
T∑
t=1
(
η‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
4η
‖xt − zt‖2 − 1
4η
‖xt − zt−1‖2 + 1
η
(
Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt−1)−Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt)
))
where we used the fact that Dϕ(a ‖ b) ≥ 12‖a − b‖2 for all a, b ∈ D (because ϕ is 1-strongly convex by
hypothesis) in the second inequality. Since the differences of divergences on the right-hand side are telescopic, we
further obtain
RT (xˆ) ≤ Dϕ(xˆ ‖ z
0)−Dϕ(xˆ ‖ zt)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖xt − zt‖2 − 1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖xt − zt−1‖2
≤ Dϕ(xˆ ‖ z
0)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖xt − zt‖2 − 1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖xt − zt−1‖2
=
Dϕ(xˆ ‖ z0)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
4η
T∑
t=1
‖xt − zt‖2 − 1
4η
T−1∑
t=0
‖xt+1 − zt‖2
≤ Dϕ(xˆ ‖ z
0)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt − zt‖2 − 1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − zt‖2
=
Dϕ(xˆ ‖ z0)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
4η
T−1∑
t=1
(
‖xt − zt‖2 + ‖xt+1 − zt‖2
)
,
where we used the nonnegativity of divergences in the second inequality, and some trivial manipulation of sum-
mation indices in the later steps. Finally, we use the triangle inequality for the norm ‖ · ‖ to conclude that at all
t = 1, . . . , T − 1
‖xt − zt‖2 + ‖xt+1 − zt‖2 ≥ 1
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖2,
and hence for all xˆ ∈ D
RT (xˆ) ≤ Dϕ(xˆ ‖ z
0)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
8η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2.
When∇ϕ(z0) = 0 as in Line 1 in Algorithm 2, Dϕ(xˆ ‖ z0) ≤ ϕ(xˆ) and so Proposition 5 becomes
Corollary 1. For all xˆ ∈ D, all η > 0, and all times T , the regret cumulated by (predictive) OMD (Algorithm 2)
compared to any fixed strategy xˆ ∈ D is bounded as
RT (xˆ) ≤ ϕ(xˆ)
η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖`t −mt‖2∗ −
1
8η
T−1∑
t=1
‖xt+1 − xt‖2. (11)
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C Online Linear Optimization to Approachability
Proposition 2. Let (X ,Y,u(·, ·), C) be an approachability game, where C ⊆ Rn is a closed convex cone, such
that each halfspace H ⊇ C is approachable (Definition 1). Let K := C◦ ∩ Bn2 , where C◦ = {x ∈ Rn : 〈x,y〉 ≤
0 ∀y ∈ C} denotes the polar cone to C. Finally, let L be an oracle for the OLO problem (for example, the FTRL
or OMD algorithm) whose domain of decisions is any closed convex set D, such that K ⊆ D ⊆ C◦. Then, at
all times T , the distance between the average payoff cumulated by Algorithm 3 and the target cone C is upper
bounded as
min
sˆ∈C
∥∥∥∥∥sˆ− 1T
T∑
t=1
u(xt,yt)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
T
max
xˆ∈K
RTL(xˆ),
where RTL(xˆ) is the regret cumulated by L up to time T compared to always playing xˆ ∈ K.
Proof. Let K := C◦ ∩ Bn2 . As proved by Abernethy et al. [1], the distance from the generic point z to the convex
cone C can be computed as
min
sˆ∈C
‖sˆ− z‖2 = max
θˆ∈K
〈θˆ, z〉.
Hence,
min
sˆ∈C
∥∥∥∥∥sˆ− 1T
T∑
t=1
u(xt,yt)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= max
θˆ∈K
〈
θˆ,
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(xt,yt)
〉
= − 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈θt, `t〉+ 1
T
max
θˆ∈K
{
T∑
t=1
〈`t,θt − θˆ〉
}
(12)
where the second step uses `t = −u(xt,yt). Since θt ∈ D ⊆ C◦, the halfspace Ht := {z : 〈θt, z〉 ≤ 0}
contains C at all times t. Furthermore, by construction xt forces Ht, and so 〈θt, `t〉 = −〈θt,u(xt,yt)〉 ≥ 0, and
therefore
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
〈θt, `t〉 ≤ 0. (13)
Plugging (13) into (12) yields the statement.
D Connections between FTRL, OMD and RM, RM+
Theorem 1 (FTRL reduces to RM). For all η > 0, when Algorithm 3 is set up with D = Rn≥0 and the regret
minimizer Lftrlη to play Γ, it produces the same iterates as the RM algorithm.
Proof. Given the definition of Γ and Algorithm 3, at all times t, Lftrlη observes loss−u(xt, `t), where u(xt, `t) :=
〈`t,xt〉1− `t is the vector-valued payoff in Γ and measures the increase of regret at time t relative to each vertex
of the simplex. For the specific choice of domain D = Rn≥0 and regularizer ϕ(x) = 12‖x‖22, the computation of
the next iterate (Line 3 in non-predictive FTRL, Algorithm 1) reduces to
θt = arg min
xˆ∈Rn≥0
{〈
−
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t), xˆ
〉
+
1
2η
‖xˆ‖22
}
= arg min
xˆ∈Rn≥0
{〈
−2η
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t), xˆ
〉
+ ‖xˆ‖22
}
= arg min
xˆ∈Rn≥0
∥∥∥∥∥xˆ− η
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
=
[
η
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t)
]+
= η
[
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t)
]+
.
Now, the value of η > 0 does not affect the forcing action that needs to be played on Line 3 of Algorithm 3.
Indeed, whenever θt 6= 0, g(θt) = θt/‖θt‖1, so η cancels out in the fraction and at all t,
xt =
[∑T
t=1 u(x
t, `t)
]+∥∥∥∥[∑Tt=1 u(xt, `t)]+∥∥∥∥
1
.
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This is exactly the strategy output by RM.
Theorem 2 (OMD reduces to RM+). For all η > 0, when Algorithm 3 is set up with D = Rn≥0 and the regret
minimizer Lomdη to play Γ, it produces the same iterates as the RM+ algorithm.
Proof. Given the definition of Γ and Algorithm 3, at all times t, Lomdη observes loss−u(xt, `t), whereu(xt, `t) :=
〈`t,xt〉1 − `t is the vector-valued payoff in Γ and measures the increase of regret at time t relative to each
vertex of the simplex. In the non-predictive version of OMD mt = 0, Line 3 in Algorithm 2 is equivalent to
arg minDϕ(xˆ ‖ zt−1) = zt−1. Hence, for the specific choice of domain D = Rn≥0 and regularizer ϕ(x) =
1
2‖x‖22, the computation of the next iterate (Line 5 in non-predictive OMD, Algorithm 2) reduces to
θt = zt−1 = arg min
zˆ∈Rn≥0
{〈
− u(xt−1, `t−1), zˆ
〉
+
1
η
Dϕ(zˆ ‖ zt−2)
}
= arg min
zˆ∈Rn≥0
{〈
− u(xt−1, `t−1), zˆ
〉
+
1
2η
‖zˆ − zt−2‖22
}
= arg min
zˆ∈Rn≥0
∥∥∥zˆ − zt−2 − ηu(xt−1, `t−1)∥∥∥2
2
=
[
zt−2 + ηu(xt−1, `t−1)
]+
=
[
θt−1 + ηu(xt−1, `t−1)
]+
. (14)
Since θ1 = z0 = 0, the only effect of the stepsize η is a rescaling of all iterates {θt} by a constant. However, the
forcing action g(θt) = θt/‖θt‖1 is invariant to positive rescaling of θt. For this reason, all choices of η > 0 result
in the same iterates being output by the algorithm. So, in particular we can assume without loss of generality that
η = 1 in (14), which corresponds exactly to the update step in RM+.
E Predictive Blackwell Approachability and Predictive RM, RM+
Proposition 3. Let (X ,Y,u(·, ·), S) be a Blackwell approachability game, where every halfspace H ⊇ S is
approachable (Definition 1). For all T , given predictions vt of the payoff vectors, there exist algorithms for
playing the game (that is, pick xt ∈ X at all t) that guarantee
min
sˆ∈S
∥∥∥∥∥sˆ− 1T
T∑
t=1
u(xt,yt)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1√
T
(
1 +
2
T
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt,yt)− vt‖22
)
.
Proof. As shown by Abernethy et al. [1], a Blackwell approachability game with a non-conic target set can be
converted to a conic target set at the cost of a factor 2 in the distance bound. Hence, we assume that S is a closed
convex cone, and use the construction of Algorithm 3 instantiated with the FTRL algorithm with domain D = S◦,
regularizer ϕ(x) = 12‖x‖22, and stepsize parameter η > 0. Proposition 2, along with the aforementioned factor 2
reduction from generic convex target set to conic target set, implies that
min
sˆ∈C
∥∥∥∥∥sˆ− 1T
T∑
t=1
u(xt,yt)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 2
T
max
xˆ∈S◦∩Bn2
RT (xˆ)
≤ 2
T
max
xˆ∈S◦∩Bn2
(
‖xˆ‖22
2η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt,yt)− vt‖22
)
≤ 2
T
(
1
2η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt,yt)− vt‖22
)
where the second inequality follows from expanding the regret bound for FTRL (Proposition 4), and the third
inequality follows from the fact that xˆ ∈ Bn2 . Setting η = 1√T yields the result.
Theorem 3 (Correctness of PRM, PRM+). Let Lftrl*η and Lomd*η denote the predictive FTRL and predictive OMD
algorithms instantiated with the same choice of regularizer and domain as in Section 5, and predictions vt as
defined above for the Blackwell approachability game Γ. For all η > 0, when Algorithm 3 is set up withD = Rn≥0,
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the regret minimizer Lftrl*η (resp., Lomd*η ) to play Γ, it produces the same iterates as the PRM (resp., PRM+)
algorithm. Furthermore, PRM and PRM+ are regret minimizer for the domain ∆n, and at all times T satisfy the
regret bound
RT (xˆ) ≤
√
2
(
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt, `t)− vt‖22
)1/2
=
√
2
(
T∑
t=1
∥∥∥〈`t,xt〉1− 〈mt,xt−1〉1− (`t −mt)∥∥∥2
2
)1/2
.
Proof. Given the definition of Γ and Algorithm 3, at all times t, Lftrl*η and Lomd*η observe loss −u(xt, `t), where
u(xt, `t) := 〈`t,xt〉1 − `t is the vector-valued payoff in Γ and measures the increase of regret at time t relative
to each vertex of the simplex. Furthermore, at all t the prediction given to Lftrl*η and Lomd*η is −vt (Line 2,
Algorithm 3). We now break up the analysis according to the OLO oracle used.
Lftrl*η corresponds to Predictive RM For the specific choice of domain D = Rn≥0 and regularizer ϕ = ‖ · ‖22,
Line 3 in Algorithm 1 has the closed-form solution
θt =
[
−η
(
−
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t)− vt
)]+
= η
[
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t) + vt
]+
.
Since the forcing action g(θt) = θt/‖θt‖1 is invariant to positive constants, we see that the action xt picked by
Algorithm 3 (Line 3) is the same for all values of η > 0 and is computed as
xt =
[∑T
t=1 u(x
t, `t) + vt
]+∥∥∥∥[∑Tt=1 u(xt, `t) + vt]+∥∥∥∥
1
. (15)
provided θt 6= 0, and is an arbitrary vector xt ∈ ∆n otherwise, in accordance with the analysis of the ap-
proachability of halfspaces in Γ (Section 5). By using the definition of u(xt, `t) := 〈`t,xt〉1 − `t and
vt := 〈mt,xt−1〉1 −mt, we see that at all times t the iterates produced by Line 4 in Algorithm 4 are exactly as
in (15).
Lomd*η corresponds to Predictive RM+ For the specific choice of domain D = Rn≥0 and regularizer ϕ = ‖ · ‖22,
as already note in the proof of Theorem 2, Line 5 in Predictive OMD (Algorithm 2) has the closed-form solution
zt =
[
zt−1 + ηu(xt, `t)
]+
(16)
at all t. Similarly, Line 3 in Predictive OMD (Algorithm 2) has the closed-form solution
θt =
[
zt−1 + ηvt
]+
. (17)
Since both (16) and (17) are homogeneous in η > 0 (that is, the only effect of η is to rescale all θt and zt by
the same constant) and the forcing action g(θt) = θt/‖θt‖1 for Γ is invariant to positive rescaling of θt, we see
that Algorithm 3 outputs the same iterates no matter the choice of stepsize parameter η > 0. In particular, we can
assume without loss of generality that η = 1. In that case, Equation (16) corresponds exactly to Line 7 in PRM+
(Algorithm 5), and line Equation (17) corresponds exactly to Line 4.
Regret analysis The regret RT (xˆ) cumulated by PRM and PRM+ satisfies
1
T
RT (xˆ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(
〈`t,xt〉 − 〈`t, xˆ〉
)
=
T∑
t=1
(
〈`t,xt〉〈1, xˆ〉 − 〈`t, xˆ〉
)
=
〈
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈`t,xt〉1− `t, xˆ
〉
=
〈
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t), xˆ
〉
= min
sˆ∈Rn≤0
〈
−sˆ+ 1
T
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t), xˆ
〉
, (18)
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where we used the fact that xˆ ∈ ∆n in the second equality, and the fact that minsˆ∈Rn≤0〈−sˆ, xˆ〉 = 0 since xˆ ≥ 0.
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to the right-hand side of (18), we obtain
1
T
RT (xˆ) ≤ min
sˆ∈Rn≤0
∥∥∥∥∥−sˆ+ 1T
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
‖xˆ‖2.
So, using the fact that ‖xˆ‖2 ≤ 1 for any xˆ ∈ ∆n, and applying Proposition 2,
1
T
RT (xˆ) ≤ min
sˆ∈Rn≤0
∥∥∥∥∥−sˆ+ 1T
T∑
t=1
u(xt, `t)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
T
max
xˆ′∈Rn≥0∩Bn2
RTL(xˆ
′), (19)
where RTL is the regret cumulated by the OLO oracle used in Algorithm 3—in our case, Lftrl*η for PRM and Lomd*η
for PRM+. For either L = Lftrl*η and L = Lomd*η , Proposition 1 guarantees that
max
xˆ′∈Rn≥0∩Bn2
RTL(xˆ
′) ≤ max
xˆ′∈Rn≥0∩Bn2
{
‖xˆ′‖22
2η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt, `t)− vt‖22
}
≤ 1
2η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt, `t)− vt‖22, (20)
where we used the fact that xˆ′ ∈ Bn2 in the last step. Substituting (20) into (19), we have
RT (xˆ) ≤ 1
2η
+ η
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt, `t)− vt‖22.
Since we have shown above that the iterates produced by the algorithm are independent of η > 0, we can minimize
the right-hand side over η > 0, obtaining the bound
RT (xˆ) ≤
√
2
(
T∑
t=1
‖u(xt, `t)− vt‖22
)1/2
.
Finally, expanding the definition of u(xt, `t) := 〈`t,xt〉1 − `t and vt := 〈mt,xt−1〉1 −mt, we obtain the
statement.
F Extensive-Form Games and Counterfactual Regret Minimization
An extensive-form game is a game played on a game tree. Each player in an extensive-form game faces a sequential
decision process. A sequential decision process is a tree consisting of two types of nodes: decision nodes and
observation nodes. We denote the set of decision nodes as J , and the set of observation nodes with K. At each
decision node j ∈ J , the agent picks an action according to a distribution xj ∈ ∆nj over the set Aj of nj = |Aj |
actions available at that decision node, and the process moves to the observation node that is reached by following
the edge corresponding to the selected action at j, if any. At each observation point k ∈ K, the agent receives
one out of nk possible signals; the set of signals that the agent can observe is denoted as Sk. After the signal is
received, the process moves to the decision node that is reached by following the edge corresponding to the signal
at k.
The observation node that is reached by the agent after picking action a ∈ Aj at decision point j ∈ J is denoted
by ρ(j, a). Likewise, the decision node reached by the agent after observing signal s ∈ Sk at observation point
k ∈ K is denoted by ρ(k, s). The set of all observation points reachable from j ∈ J is denoted as Cj := {ρ(j, a) :
a ∈ Aj}. Similarly, the set of all decision points reachable from k ∈ K is denoted as Ck := {ρ(k, s) : s ∈ Sk}. To
ease the notation, sometimes we will use the notation Cja to mean Cρ(j,a).
Pairs z = (j, a) with j ∈ J , a ∈ Aj for which ρ(j, a) = ∅ are called terminal sequences and have an associated
payoff vector (u(z),−u(z)) (that is, we assume the game is zero sum). We denote the set of all terminal sequences
(also called leaves) with Z.
Sequence Form for Sequential Decision Processes Given a strategy {xj}j∈J for the player, its sequence-form
representation [40], denoted µ(x) is defined as the vector indexed over {(j, a) : j ∈ J , a ∈ Aj} whose entry
corresponding to a generic pair (j, a) is the product of the probability of all actions on the path from the root of
the decision process to (j, a). We denote the range of µ, that is the set of all possible sequence-form strategies as
the xj vary arbitrarily over ∆|Aj | as Q. We call Q the sequence-form strategy space of the player.
19
It is well-known that a Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum extensive form game can be expressed as a
bilinear saddle point problem
min
q1∈Q1
max
q2∈Q2
q>1Aq2,
where Q1 and Q2 are the sequence-form strategy spaces of Player 1 and 2, respectively, andA is a suitable game-
dependent matrix. It is also common knowledge that by letting regret minimizers for Q1 and Q2 play against
each other, we can sole the bilinear saddle point above (e.g., Farina et al. [14]). So, we now focus on the task of
constructing a regret minimizer for a sequence-form strategy space.
F.1 Counterfactual Regret Minimization
The counterfactual regret minimization framework [42] provides a way of constructing a regret minimization for
the sequence-form strategy space of a player by combining independent regret minimizers local to each of the
player’s decision points j ∈ J . At each j ∈ J , the corresponding regret minimizer—denotedRj—is responsible
for selecting the strategy xtj at all times t.
CFR achieves its goal byu setting the losses observed by the local regret minimizers in a specific way. In particular,
let `t be the loss at time t relative to the whole sequence-form strategy space Q of the player. Then, for each
decision point j ∈ J , the regret minimizer Rj local at j is fed the loss vector `tj ∈ R|Aj |, whose entries are
defined as
`tj [a] := `
t[(j, a)] +
∑
j′∈Cja
V tj′ (21)
for each a ∈ Aj , where
V tj :=
∑
a∈Aj
xtj [a]
`t[(j, a)] + ∑
j′∈Cja
V tj′
 ∀j ∈ J . (22)
Theorem 4 (Laminar regret decomposition, [14]). At all times T , the regret RT cumulated by the CFR algorithm
can be bounded as
max
xˆ∈Q
RT (xˆ) ≤ max
xˆ∈Q
∑
j∈J
xˆ[σ(j)] ·RTj (xˆj)
where RTj denotes the regret cumulated by the local regret minimizerRj at decision point j.
Theorem 4 in particular implies that if all local regret minimizersRj (j ∈ J ) guarantee O(T 1/2) regret, then does
the overall algorithm, that is RT (xˆ) = O(T 1/2) for all xˆ ∈ Q.
F.2 Counterfactual Loss Predictions
We now describe the construction of the counterfactual loss predictions, starting from a generic prediction mt
for `t relative to the whole sequence-form strategy space Q of the player. In order to maintain symmetry with
Equation (21) and Equation (22), for each decision point j ∈ J , the regret minimizer Rj local at j is fed the loss
prediction vectormtj ∈ R|Aj |, whose entries are defined as
mtj [a] := m
t[(j, a)] +
∑
j′∈Cja
W tj′
for each a ∈ Aj , where
W tj :=
∑
a∈Aj
xtj [a]
mt[(j, a)] + ∑
j′∈Cja
W tj′
 ∀j ∈ J .
It important to observe that the counterfactual loss prediction mtj depends on the decisions produced at time t in
the subtree rooted at j. In other words, in order to construct the prediction for what loss Rj will observe after
producing the decision xtj , we use the “future” decisions from the subtrees under j.
In our experiments, we always set mt = `t−1. This is a common choice, that in other algorithms (not ours) is
known to lead to asymptotically lower regret than O(T 1/2) [38, 17, 17].
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G Description of the Game Instances
Kuhn poker (Games [G] and [H]) is a standard benchmark in the EFG-solving community [28]. In Kuhn poker,
each player puts an ante worth 1 into the pot. Each player is then privately dealt one card from a deck that
contains R unique cards. Then, a single round of betting then occurs, with the following dynamics. First,
Player 1 decides to either check or bet 1. Then,
• If Player 1 checks Player 2 can check or raise 1.
– If Player 2 checks a showdown occurs; if Player 2 raises Player 1 can fold or call.
∗ If Player 1 folds Player 2 takes the pot; if Player 1 calls a showdown occurs.
• If Player 1 raises Player 2 can fold or call.
– If Player 2 folds Player 1 takes the pot; if Player 2 calls a showdown occurs.
When a showdown occurs, the player with the higher card wins the pot and the game immediately ends.
We used R = 3 in Game [G] (this corresponds to the original game as introduced by Kuhn [28]), while
in Game [H] we used R = 13.
Leduc poker (Games [N] to [Q]) is another standard benchmark in the EFG-solving community [37]. The game
is played with a deck of R unique cards, each of which appears exactly twice in the deck. The game is
composed of two rounds. In the first round, each player places an ante of 1 in the pot and is dealt a single
private card. A round of betting then takes place, with Player 1 acting first. At most two bets are allowed
per player. Then, a card is is revealed face up and another round of betting takes place, with the same
dynamics described above. After the two betting round, if one of the players has a pair with the public
card, that player wins the pot. Otherwise, the player with the higher card wins the pot. All bets in the first
round are worth 1, while all bets in the second round are 2.
We set R = 3 in Game [N], R = 5 in Game [O], R = 9 in Game [P], and R = 13 in Game [Q].
Small matrix (Game [F]) is a small 2× 2 matrix game. Given a mixed strategy x = (x1, x2) ∈ ∆2 for Player 1
and a mixed strategy y = (y1, y2) ∈ ∆2 for Player 2, the payoff function for player 1 is defined as
u(x,y) := 5x1y1 − x1y2 + x2y2.
This game was found by [17] to be a hard instance for the CFR+ game.
Goofspiel (Games [A] and [K]) This is another popular benchmark game, originally proposed by Ross [35]. It is
a two-player card game, employing three identical decks of k cards each whose values range from 1 to
k. At the beginning of the game, each player gets dealt a full deck as their hand, and the third deck (the
“prize” deck) is shuffled and put face down on the board. In each turn, the topmost card from the prize
deck is revealed. Then, each player privately picks a card from their hand. This card acts as a bid to win
the card that was just revealed from the prize deck. The selected cards are simultaneously revealed, and
the highest one wins the prize card. If the players’ played cards are equal, the prize card is split. The
players’ score are computed as the sum of the values of the prize cards they have won. In Game [K] the
value of k is k = 4, while in Game [A] k = 5.
Limited-information Goofspiel (Games [L] and [M]) This is a variant of the Goofspiel game used by Lanctot
et al. [29]. In this variant, in each turn the players do not reveal their cards. Rather, they show their
cards to a fair umpire, which determines which player has played the highest card and should therefore
received the prize card. In case of tie, the umpire directs the players to discard the prize card just like in
the Goofspiel game. In Game [L] the number of cards in each deck is k = 4, while in Game [M] k = 5.
Pursuit-evasion (Games [E], [I], and [J]) is a security-inspired pursuit-evasion game played on the graph shown
in Figure 3. It is a zero-sum variant of the one used by Kroer et al. [25], and a similar search game has
been considered by Bošansky` et al. [4] and Bošansky` and Cˇermák [5].
In each turn, the attacker and the defender act simultaneously. The defender controls two patrols, one
per each respective patrol areas labeled P1 and P2. Each patrol can move by one step along the grey
dashed lines, or stay in place. The attacker starts from the leftmost node (labeled S) and at each turn
can move to any node adjacent to its current position by following the black directed edges. The attacker
can also choose to wait in place for a time step in order to hide all their traces. If a patrol visits a node
that was previously visited by the attacker, and the attacker did not wait to clean up their traces, they will
see that the attacker was there. The goal of the attacker is to reach any of the rightmost nodes, whose
corresponding payoffs are 5, 10, or 3, respectively, as indicated in Figure 3. If at any time the attacker
and any patrol meet at the same node, the attacker is loses the game, which leads to a payoff of −1 for
the attacker and of 1 for the defender. The game times out after m simultaneous moves, in which case
both players defender receive payoffs 0. In Game [I] we set m = 4, in Game [J] we set m = 5 and in
Game [E] we set m = 6.
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Figure 3: The graph on which the search game is played.
Battleship (Games [C] and [R]) is a parametric version of a classic board game, where two competing fleets take
turns shooting at each other [19]. At the beginning of the game, the players take turns at secretly placing
a set of ships on separate grids (one for each player) of size 3 × 2. Each ship has size 2 (measured in
terms of contiguous grid cells) and a value of 4, and must be placed so that all the cells that make up the
ship are fully contained within each player’s grids and do not overlap with any other ship that the player
has already positioned on the grid. After all ships have been placed. the players take turns at firing at
their opponent. Ships that have been hit at all their cells are considered sunk. The game continues until
either one player has sunk all of the opponent’s ships, or each player has completed R shots. At the end
of the game, each player’s payoff is calculated as the sum of the values of the opponent’s ships that were
sunk, minus the sum of the values of ships which that player has lost.
In Game [R] we set R = 3, while in Game [C] we set R = 4.
River Endgame (Game [D]) The river endgame is structured and parameterized as follows. The game is param-
eterized by the conditional distribution over hands for each player, current pot size, board state (5 cards
dealt to the board), and a betting abstraction. First, Chance deals out hands to the two players according
to the conditional hand distribution. Then, Libratus has the choice of folding, checking, or betting by
a number of multipliers of the pot size: 0.25x, 0.5x, 1x, 2x, 4x, 8x, and all-in. If Libratus checks and
the other player bets then Libratus has the choice of folding, calling (i.e. matching the bet and ending
the betting), or raising by pot multipliers 0.4x, 0.7x, 1.1x, 2x, and all-in. If Libratus bets and the other
player raises Libratus can fold, call, or raise by 0.4x, 0.7x, 2x, and all-in. Finally when facing subsequent
raises Libratus can fold, call, or raise by 0.7x and all-in. When faced with an initial check, the opponent
can fold, check, or raise by 0.5x, 0.75x, 1x, and all-in. When faced with an initial bet the opponent
can fold, call, or raise by 0.7x, 1.1x, and all-in. When faced with subsequent raises the opponent can
fold, call, or raise by 0.7x and all-in. The game ends whenever a player folds (the other player wins all
money in the pot), calls (a showdown occurs), or both players check as their first action of the game (a
showdown occurs). In a showdown the player with the better hands wins the pot. The pot is split in case
of a tie. The specific endgame we use is subgame 4 from the set of open-sourced Libratus subgames at
https://github.com/Sandholm-Lab/LibratusEndgames.
Liar’s dice (Game [B]) is is another standard benchmark in the EFG-solving community [30]. In our instantiation,
each of the two players initially privately rolls an unbiased 6-face die. Then, the two players alternate in
making (potentially false) claims about their toss. At each round, the player whose turn it is to play can
either claim that the outcome of their roll is either a 6 has a face value of v, or call their opponent a liar.
When the player claims the outcome of their roll is a 6 or a v, the value v must be strictly greater than the
previous value v that was claimed by opponent (if any). When the player calls the opponent a liar, the
players’ dice are revealed and a showdown occurs. If the last opponent’s claim is false, the player that
called liar on the opponent wins the game and gains a positive utility of +1; otherwise, the player loses
the game and gains a negative utility of −1.
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Decision
points Actions Leaves
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[G] 12 24 30
[H] 52 106 780
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[L] 1.7×104 2.1×104 1.4×104
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Legend: PCFR+ CFR+ LCFR DCFR
Figure 4: Performance of PCFR+, CFR+, DCFR, and LCFR on EFGs. In all plots, the x axis is the number of
iterations of each algorithm. For each game, the top plot shows that the Nash gap on the y axis (on a log scale),
the bottom plot shows and the average prediction error (on a log scale).
In all games but Leduc 13 (Game [Q]), PCFR+ significantly outperforms all other algorithms, by 2-8 orders of
magnitude. In Leduc 13, PCFR+ outperforms CFR+ but not the DCFR algorithm. CFR+ is equivalent or slightly
superior to DCFR, except in Leduc 13, where it outperforms CFR+ by slightly less of one order of magnitude. This
is in line with the experimental results presented in the body of this paper, where we found that DCFR performs
significantly better than CFR+ in poker games but not other domains.
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Figure 5: Performance of PCFR+, CFR+, DCFR, and LCFR on EFGs. In all plots, the x axis is the number of
iterations of each algorithm. For each game, the top plot shows that the Nash gap on the y axis (on a log scale),
the bottom plot shows and the average prediction error (on a log scale).
CFR+, LCFR, and DCFR perform similarly in the Small matrix game (Game [F]), and in particular all exhibit
slower than T−1 convergence. This is not the case for our predictive algorithm PCFR+. This confirms that Small
matrix is a hard instance for non-predictive methods but not for predictive methods, as already observed by Farina
et al. [17].
In all game instances, we empirically find that the prediction error decreases quickly to extremely small values.
This suggests that PCFR+ might enjoy stability guarantees similar to predictive FTRL and OMD [38]. Exploring
such properties is an interesting future research direction.
Correlation between game structure and PCFR+ performance The empirical investigation of PCFR+ shows
that in most classes of games PCFR+ performs significantly better than CFR+ and DCFR, while in other games
(such as the poker games and Liar’s Dice) predictivity seems to be less useful or even detrimental. It is natural to
wonder what game structures can benefit from the use of predictive methods and what do not. While we do not
currently have a good answer to that question, we have collected here some thoughts and observations.
• Size. Some predictive methods proposed in the past were found to only produce a speedup in small games,
and perform worse than the state of the art in large games [17]. This is not the case for PCFR+: the river
endgame and Liar’s Dice are not the largest games in our dataset. So, size does not seem to be a good
predictor for whether predictive CFR+ is beneficial over CFR+ and DCFR.
• Number of terminal states. The river endgame and Liar’s Dice both have a large ratio between the num-
ber of terminal states (leaves) and number of decision points. On the other hand, the pursuit-evasion
game with 5 turns (Game [J]) has a significantly larger ratio than Liar’s Dice but unlike in Liar’s Dice,
predictivity yields a speedup of more than 6 orders of magnitude on the Nash gap.
• Private information. Poker games and Liar’s Dice have a strong private information structure: a chance
node distributes independent private initial states for the two players, and each player has no information
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about the opponent’s state. This is in contrast with, for example, the Battleship games, where each player
is not handed a random configuration for their ships by the chance player, but rather privately picks one
configuration. This shows that the “amount of private information” alone is not a good discriminator for
when predictivity can be useful.
• Private information induced by chance nodes. From the discussion in the previous bullet, we conjecture
that the way the private information arises (for example, through "dealing out cards" like in Poker games
or "rolling a die" as in Liar’s Dice) might affect whether predictivity helps or hurts convergence to Nash
equilibrium. We leave pursuing this direction open. It is not immediately clear how one could formalize
that metric.
H.1 Comparison between Linear and Quadratic Averaging in PCFR+ and CFR+
We also investigated the performance of CFR+ with quadratic averaging in all games, as well as the performance of
PCFR+ with linear averaging. The experimental results are shown in Figures 6 and 8. Since only the averaging that
is used when computing the (approximate) Nash equilibrium varies, but not the iterates themselves, the prediction
errors are independent of the averaging variant used. Therefore, in the prediction error plots we only report one
curve for each of the two algorithms.
CFR+ with quadratic averaging of iterates performs similarly to CFR+ with linear averaging. PCFR+ with linear
averaging performs similarly or slightly better than PCFR+ with quadratic averaging in two games. It performs
better than CFR+ with either linear or quadratic averaging in 11 games, and worse than both in two games (no-
limit Texas hold’em river endgame and Leduc poker). We conclude that the speedup of PCFR+ is mostly due to
the use of loss predictions, rather than the particular averaging of iterates.
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Figure 6: Performance of PCFR+ and CFR+ with linear and quadratic averaging on EFGs. In all plots, the x axis
is the number of iterations of each algorithm. For each game, the top plot shows that the Nash gap on the y axis
(on a log scale), the bottom plot shows and the average prediction error (on a log scale).
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Figure 7: (continued) Performance of PCFR+ and CFR+ with linear and quadratic averaging on EFGs. In all
plots, the x axis is the number of iterations of each algorithm. For each game, the top plot shows that the Nash gap
on the y axis (on a log scale), the bottom plot shows and the average prediction error (on a log scale).
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Figure 8: (continued) Performance of PCFR+ and CFR+ with linear and quadratic averaging on EFGs. In all
plots, the x axis is the number of iterations of each algorithm. For each game, the top plot shows that the Nash gap
on the y axis (on a log scale), the bottom plot shows and the average prediction error (on a log scale).
H.2 Predictive Discounted CFR and Quadratic-Average Loss Prediction
DCFR is the regret minimizer that results from applying the counterfactual regret minimization framework (Ap-
pendix F) using the discounted regret matching regret minimizer at each decision point. We experimentally evalu-
ated a predictive-in-spirit1 variant of discounted regret matching shown in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6: Predictive discounted regret matching
1 z0 ← 0 ∈ Rn, x0 ← 1/n ∈ ∆n
2 α← 1.5, β ← 0
3 function NEXTSTRATEGY(mt)
. Setmt = 0 for non-predictive version
4 θt ← t
α
1 + tα
[zt−1]+ +
tβ
1 + tβ
[zt−1]− + 〈mt,xt〉1−mt
5 if θt 6= 0 return xt ← θt / ‖θt‖1
6 else return xt ← arbitrary point in ∆n
7 function OBSERVELOSS(`t)
8 zt ← t
α
1 + tα
[zt−1]+ +
tβ
1 + tβ
[zt−1]− + 〈`t,xt〉1− `t
To maintain symmetry with predictive CFR and predictive CFR+, we coin predictive DCFR the algorithm resulting
from applying the counterfactual regret minimization framework (Appendix F) using the predictive discounted
regret matching regret minimizer at each decision point of the game.
We also investigate the use of the quadratic average of past loss vectors,
mt =
6
t(t− 1)(2t− 1)
t−1∑
τ=1
τ2`τ ,
as the prediction for the next loss `t. We call this loss prediction the “quadratic-average loss prediction”.
We compare predictive DCFR (with and without quadratic-average loss prediction), PCFR+ (with and without
quadratic-average loss prediction), CFR+, and DCFR in Figures 9 and 10.
1In fact, we do not have a proof that our variant is predictive in the formal sense described in the body of the paper. However,
the variant we describe follows the natural pattern of predictive RM and predictive RM+.
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Figure 9: Comparison between of discounted CFR and CFR+, with and without quadratic-average loss prediction.
In all plots, the x axis is the number of iterations of each algorithm. For each game, the top plot shows that the
Nash gap on the y axis (on a log scale), the bottom plot shows and the average prediction error (on a log scale).
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Figure 10: (continued) Comparison between of discounted CFR and CFR+, with and without quadratic-average
loss prediction. In all plots, the x axis is the number of iterations of each algorithm. For each game, the top plot
shows that the Nash gap on the y axis (on a log scale), the bottom plot shows and the average prediction error (on
a log scale).
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